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T
hank you very much for that kind introduction. It is very nice indeed to
be here in the Shenandoah Valley. Like Woodrow Wilson, I’m a native
son of Virginia. Unlike him, I can’t claim to have begun life in this
magniﬁcent Valley. But I did have the pleasure of completing my undergradu-
ate studies not too far from here at Washington and Lee. So I feel very much
at home here, and I appreciate your invitation to be with you.
The theme of this conference is “Facing Economic Issues: Clinton and
Wilson.” And this is a quite appropriate theme, because there are obvious paral-
lels. President Clinton and the country face pressing economic problems today,
many of which have been discussed by previous speakers at this conference.
President Wilson also faced substantial economic challenges in his Administra-
tions. One of President Wilson’s greatest achievements—which occurred in his
ﬁrst year in ofﬁce—was his orchestration of the difﬁcult compromise, among
a number of powerful and conﬂicting groups in the country, that culminated
in passage of the Federal Reserve Act in December 1913 and the creation of
our central bank, including its regional arms, the Federal Reserve Banks, the
following year.
Against this background, what I would like to do this morning is to tell you
a story: an historical story, if I may, which seems appropriate in this setting.
It is the story of the Federal Reserve, inﬂation, deﬂation and the relationship
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between the three. Probably everyone here knows that the Fed is supposed to
maintain the purchasing power of the American dollar and to prevent inﬂation.
It is also supposed to prevent deﬂation, which is not much on people’s minds
today, but was at times in Wilson’s day and certainly in the 1930s. Another way
of saying this is that the Fed is supposed to keep the aggregate level of prices—
not the individual prices of particular goods and services, but the aggregate
price level—reasonably stable over time. A stable price level by deﬁnition
implies the absence of both persistent inﬂation and persistent deﬂation.
That the Fed is in some sense responsible for stabilizing the price level
presupposes some beneﬁt from doing so. As many of you know, there has been
far less than complete agreement in the United States, both in the distant past
and more recently, on the desirability of price-level stability—particularly the
desirability of controlling inﬂation. Some people, especially those who borrow
money regularly, beneﬁt from inﬂation, at least temporarily and partially. But
I think it’s fair to say that a majority of Americans value a stable price level
and a sound dollar, even if they don’t think about it a lot. In general they
don’t want the frequently high and typically variable inﬂation rates that have
plagued so many other countries in the past and now. Americans sense that sta-
ble prices and stable money prevent the arbitrary redistributions of real income
and wealth that accompany inﬂation and weaken societies. They sense also that
stable prices and stable money eliminate the confusion, uncertainty, risk and
inefﬁciency that inﬂation introduces into the nation’s free market system.
Now while most Americans believe that the Fed is supposed to “ﬁght”
inﬂation and deﬂation in some general sense, they are also aware that the ﬁght
has been an uneven one and by no means fully successful in all periods of our
history. On the contrary, the country went through a cataclysmic deﬂation in
the 1930s. Subsequently it went through a substantial inﬂation in the late 1970s
and early 1980s—not as traumatic and damaging as the experience in the ’30s,
but a very bad time nonetheless.
What’s the problem? Why hasn’t the Fed done a better job? I am going to
argue today that one reason—and maybe the main reason—is that the Fed does
not now have, and it never has had, a clear congressional mandate to stabilize
the price level. Consequently, the Fed’s success in stabilizing the price level
in at least some periods of its history has been and continues to be a func-
tion largely of (1) prevailing general economic conditions, (2) the strength of
the Federal Reserve’s leaders, and (3) old-fashioned luck. The implication, of
course, is that something probably should be done to strengthen the Fed’s hand
so that its performance would be less dependent on fortuitous circumstances.
And let me make it clear that I personally feel strongly that something should
be done. I am well aware that in today’s relatively low inﬂation climate, many
people do not see this as a pressing issue, such as the federal budget deﬁcit or
health care reform, that requires immediate attention. I disagree for reasons I
hope to make clear in the remainder of my comments.   
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There are probably several ways one could make this argument, but, as
I suggested earlier, I want to take an historical approach, which seems ap-
propriate here. I’ll proceed as follows. First, I want brieﬂy to describe the
monetary conditions that led to the creation of the Fed—with the assistance of
Woodrow Wilson. Then I will try to indicate exactly what the framers of the
Federal Reserve Act expected the Fed to do—its mandate in 1913 and 1914,
as it were. A particular point here is that the mandate did not include, in any
explicit way, stabilizing the price level. Next, I’ll indicate how the rapid and
substantial change in circumstances during and after World War I, shortly after
the Fed was created, forced the Fed to confront the problem of stabilizing the
price level early on in the 1920s, a challenge it met with some success until
the stock market crash in 1929. All of this is the “then” part of my remarks.
Finally, I’ll skip over to the late 1970s and 1980s—the “now” part—and show
that the Federal Reserve has faced many of the same inﬂation challenges in
recent years that it faced in the 1920s. It has achieved some success in this
later period also, for remarkably similar reasons. However, the absence of a
clear price-level stability mandate today presents the nation with some—not
all, but some—of the same kinds of risks it faced in its early years. We are
much better equipped to deal with these risks now than we were then. But we
can and should reduce them by clarifying the Fed’s price stability mandate,
preferably through legislation.
That’s my introduction, and it has been a long one. But let me proceed,
and I will try to make the remainder of my points as compactly as I can.
1. THE GOLD STANDARD AND PRICE STABILITY BEFORE
THE FEDERAL RESERVE
As I suggested a minute ago, the Federal Reserve was established in 1914
to remedy banking and currency problems that had been recurring since the
Civil War. The country had no central bank during this period, which is known
to economic historians as the National Banking Era. The United States left
the gold standard to help ﬁnance the Civil War, but returned to it in 1879.
Thereafter, monetary conditions were largely governed by the ﬂow of gold to
and from the United States as part of the international balance of payments
adjustment mechanism under the international gold standard.
Under the gold standard, the national money supply was closely linked
to the nation’s stock of monetary gold, which included gold coin, Treasury
currency backed by gold, and gold reserves held by banks. When the country
ran a balance of trade surplus, for example, the excess of foreign receipts over
expenditures was received in gold. The gold inﬂow set in train a multiple
expansion of deposits that increased the money supply. The increase in the
money supply then increased domestic demand for goods and services and put    
4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
upward pressure on domestic prices. The reverse occurred when the country
ran a trade deﬁcit. For our purposes, the point is that under a gold standard
without a central bank, the nation’s stock of money was automatically regulated
by conditions in world markets.
This system had good features and not-so-good features. On the good side,
the gold standard did keep the aggregate price level under control over the very
long run. The aggregate level of prices in 1914, for example, was not very
different from the level 30 years before in the early 1880s. By comparison,
the price level rose 270 percent between 1960 and 1985. So the gold standard
provided an anchor for the price level over the long run—that is, it provided
a means of stabilizing the price level over the long run. Moreover, it was a
credible anchor; the public understood the mechanism and knew it worked.
But the gold standard had signiﬁcant limitations in the short and intermedi-
ate terms. First, while the gold standard anchored the price level over the very
long run, it nonetheless allowed it to drift upward and downward by signiﬁcant
amounts over fairly long periods. For example, slow growth in the world gold
supply caused the price level to decline at over 1 percent per year from 1879
to 1897, which provoked William Jennings Bryan’s famous plea not to crucify
mankind on a cross of gold. Subsequently, new gold discoveries and improved
mining techniques caused the metal’s supply to increase rapidly in the late
1890s and early 1900s. Consequently, the price level rose at over 2 percent
per year from about 1897 to 1914. A second limitation was that the strict
discipline of the gold standard did not allow the money supply to increase
rapidly in response to domestic disturbances such as a banking panic or a stock
market crash.
2. SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATE BEHAVIOR BEFORE
THE FEDERAL RESERVE
Let me expand just a little on that last point and shift the focus temporarily
from prices to interest rates, since it was really a concern about ﬁnancial prob-
lems and sharp interest rate movements under the gold standard that led to the
Federal Reserve Act. Because the nation’s monetary gold stock was relatively
unresponsive to domestic economic conditions in the short run, the National
Banking Era was characterized by considerable short-term interest rate vari-
ability. Sudden sustained short-term interest rate spikes of over 10 percentage
points occurred on eight occasions during this period. Some, though not all,
of these spikes were associated with banking panics, which involved a loss
of conﬁdence in the banking system and a rush to convert bank deposits into
currency. Since banks held only a fractional reserve of coin and currency in
their vaults, “bank runs” generated a scramble for liquidity that could not be
satisﬁed in the short run. Major banking panics occurred in 1873, 1884, 1890,
1893 and 1907.    
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In addition to the recurring interest rate spikes, there was a pronounced
seasonal pattern in short-term interest rates. This pattern resulted from the rela-
tively strong demand for currency during the fall harvest and Christmas holiday
seasons. It was exacerbated by the reserve requirement provisions of the Na-
tional Bank Act, which led to a phenomenon known as “pyramiding”—the
concentration of reserves in big-city banks. The practice of counting corre-
spondent balances as legal reserves, combined with the payment of interest on
interbank balances, caused reserves to concentrate in the larger cities, espe-
cially in New York. The withdrawal of interbank balances in peak agricultural
and holiday periods tended to exacerbate seasonal pressures on the banking
system. Consequently, short-term interest rates varied seasonally by as much
as 6 percentage points over the course of a year.
3. THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S MANDATE IN 1914
This background information is essential in understanding what President Wil-
son and the Congress had in mind when they passed the Federal Reserve Act.
The Federal Reserve was established in 1914 in large part to alleviate the
two main problems of the National Banking Era: (1) recurrent interest rate
spikes associated with liquidity crises and banking panics, and (2) interest
rate seasonals exacerbated by reserve pyramiding. Speciﬁcally, as stated in
its preamble, the purposes of the Federal Reserve Act were “to provide for
the establishment of Federal Reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to
afford means of rediscounting paper, to establish a more effective supervision
of banking in the United States, and for other purposes.”
Under the Act, 12 Federal Reserve Banks (including ours in Richmond)
were established around the country as depositories for the required reserves
that previously had been held at correspondent banks in New York City and
elsewhere. By requiring that private banks hold reserves directly in a Federal
Reserve Bank, the Act eliminated reserve pyramiding and eased the seasonal
strain on the banking system.
The most important power given the new central bank, however, was the
authority to issue currency and to create bank reserves at least partly indepen-
dently of the nation’s monetary gold reserves. The Fed could create currency
and reserves as long as the Federal Reserve Banks kept a minimum 40 percent
gold reserve against Federal Reserve notes, which were paper currency, and
a 35 percent gold reserve against deposits held by private banks at Federal
Reserve Banks. These minimum gold reserve ratios made the Fed respect the
discipline of the gold standard; however, the monetary gold stock was so large
during the Fed’s early years that these requirements were not “binding.” In
other words, they did not constrain the volume of Federal Reserve notes that
could be issued nor the volume of bank reserve deposits that could be created
by Reserve Bank discount window lending. The power to create currency and     
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bank reserves enabled the Fed to do what it had been established to do: elimi-
nate both the seasonal in interest rates and the periodic spikes in rates that had
plagued the country during the National Banking Era.
4. PRICE STABILITY IN THE FED’S EARLY YEARS
The Expectation
As we have just seen, the new central bank was well equipped to deal with
both seasonal and special liquidity pressures and their effects on interest rates.
But we need now to shift our focus back to the price level and ask: What did
the Federal Reserve System and its ability to create currency and bank reserves
imply for the stability of the price level—that is, the stability of the purchasing
power of money? The answer is that it was taken for granted that the minimum
gold reserve ratio under the gold standard would continue to provide what
economists call a nominal anchor for the monetary system, which is a fancy
way of saying that it would provide for a reasonably stable price level over
time. (As a footnote, I should point out here that the framers of the Federal
Reserve Act apparently did not give much attention to the intermediate drift
of the price level upward and downward which, as I mentioned earlier, can
and did occur under the gold standard.) The clear presumption underlying the
Act was that the new central bank would concern itself mainly with making
liquidity available on a timely basis to smooth short-term movements in interest
rates. Any discretionary injection of currency or bank reserves for this purpose,
however, was expected to be only temporary, so that the nation’s money supply
and price level would, over the long term, be governed by the nation’s stock
of monetary gold, much as it had been before the establishment of the Fed.
Given this presumption—and this is a crucially important point about the
history of central banking in the United States—the Federal Reserve Act did
not include a mandate for price stability because everyone expected that the
price level in fact would be stable over time as long as the Federal Reserve
respected its minimum gold reserve ratio. The gold standard would guarantee
price stability and the new central bank could focus on stabilizing the banking
system and interest rates. No separate mandate to resist inﬂation or deﬂation
was needed.
Federal Reserve Policy in the Aftermath of World War I
This was the expectation. Let me turn now to the reality of the early years of the
Fed—more speciﬁcally, the period between 1914 and 1929. The presumptions
about the gold standard and price-level stability implicit in the Federal Reserve
Act were tested swiftly and severely during these years. In one of the great
ironies of monetary history, by the time the Federal Reserve Banks actually   
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opened for business in 1914, the outbreak of World War I in Europe had
brought about widespread suspensions of national commitments to maintain
the ﬁxed currency price of gold. Because the United States remained neutral
until 1917, it was able to remain on the gold standard throughout the War, and,
although it embargoed gold exports, it continued to ﬁx the dollar price of gold
at $20.67 per ounce.
As it turned out, United States participation in the War and the large federal
deﬁcits that accompanied it—yes, there were deﬁcits back then too—occasioned
the ﬁrst major use of the ﬂedgling central bank’s power to create currency and
bank reserves. Most of the federal deﬁcit was covered by sales of U.S. gov-
ernment bonds to the public. The additional supply of bonds, naturally, put
upward pressure on interest rates, which would have greatly increased the cost
of ﬁnancing the War had the pressures been allowed to persist. Consequently,
the Reserve Banks held short-term interest rates down by keeping their discount
rates low and accommodating credit demand at these rates—which they were
able to do because of the excess gold reserves I mentioned earlier. The discount
window lending by Federal Reserve Banks, in turn, increased the supply of bank
reserves and caused the U.S. money supply to rise.
Now, as you are no doubt aware, rapid money growth produces inﬂation
over time. Consequently, the highly accommodative monetary policy during
the War caused the U.S. price level approximately to double. Although the
War ended in 1918, Federal Reserve policy remained accommodative in 1919
in an effort to cushion the negative economic impact of demobilization. The
continued rapid growth in Federal Reserve notes and in bank reserves that
resulted from this policy, along with the lifting of the wartime gold embargo
that allowed gold to ﬂow abroad again, ﬁnally mopped up the excess gold and
caused the Federal Reserve’s gold reserve ratio to become binding in mid-1920,
toward the end of President Wilson’s second term.
At this point, the Fed ﬁnally had to confront the constraints of the gold
standard, and it responded afﬁrmatively and aggressively. Faced with the need
to defend its gold reserve ratio, the Fed raised its discount rate from 4 percent
to 7 percent in 1920, a near doubling. In today’s terminology this constituted
a sharp “tightening” of monetary policy, and it was strong medicine. The de-
ﬂationary impact was swift and extraordinary. Prices fell precipitously, and by
June 1921 about half of the earlier wartime increase in the price level had been
reversed. Unfortunately, the sharp decline in the price level was accompanied
by a severe economic contraction and rising unemployment lasting from early
1920 to mid-1921. But by acting as it did, the Fed essentially validated the im-
plicit assumption underlying the Federal Reserve Act—that the country would
remain on the gold standard, which would maintain a stable price level over
the long run if not the shorter run. To use some current jargon, the Fed attained
credibility for its commitment to the gold standard and price stability by its stiff
tightening of policy in 1920. As a postscript, many monetary historians would    
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argue that the Fed could have achieved greater credibility with less economic
disruption if it had tightened policy sooner. Regrettably, the cost of failure to
resist inﬂation promptly and decisively when it arises is a lesson the nation has
had to learn repeatedly.
Price Stability in the 1920s
After validating the country’s commitment to the gold standard in the early ’20s,
and once it had obtained a cushion of gold reserves above its legal minimum,
the Fed began to use its monetary policy powers to achieve a greater degree of
short-term price-level stability. Under the able leadership of Benjamin Strong,
Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Fed deliberately be-
gan to offset the effect of temporary gold inﬂows on the U.S. money supply by
selling equivalent amounts of securities from its portfolio. Likewise, temporary
short-term outﬂows of gold were offset by security purchases. Such “steriliza-
tion” insulated the U.S. economy from the money supply and aggregate demand
instability that gold ﬂows would have caused had they been allowed to affect
currency and bank reserves.
Aggregate economic conditions were favorable during most of the period
from 1922 to 1929, in my view, partly because the Fed recently had won at
least belated credibility for its commitment to price stability by defending the
gold reserve ratio in 1920 and 1921, partly because of Strong’s extraordinar-
ily skillful discretionary containment of inﬂation, and partly because of the
absence of severe economic shocks. Unfortunately, at the end of the decade,
these foundations began to crumble. After having been partially restored in the
’20s, the international gold standard became increasingly fragile and deﬂation-
ary. Moreover, Governor Strong died an untimely death in 1928, which robbed
the Fed of strong leadership. Thus the Fed—bereft of any explicit price stabil-
ity mandate—was simply unable to maintain a discretionary monetary policy
aimed at price stability. The consequence was a 30 percent decline in prices in
the early 1930s and the most terrible economic depression in American history.
Before moving to my concluding comments about the “now” period in the
title of this talk, it may be helpful to summarize brieﬂy the principal points
about the “then” period. The main point is that the Federal Reserve Act did not
mandate the Federal Reserve System to control inﬂation or stabilize the price
level; instead, it instructed the Fed, in effect, to smooth interest rates. The reason
for the omission of a price stability mandate was that it was assumed that the
gold standard would produce long-run price stability because the Fed would
adhere to its minimum gold reserve ratio over time. The Federal Reserve was
successful in pursuing price stability in the 1920s in part because of favorable
underlying economic and ﬁnancial conditions in the period between 1921 and
1929. But prices were also stable because the Fed had made its price stability
objective credible by strongly defending its minimum gold reserve ratio early
in the decade. Subsequently, the Fed reinforced its commitment by sterilizing    
Alfred Broaddus: Central Banking: Then and Now 9
gold inﬂows under the skillful leadership of Benjamin Strong. Once Strong and
the favorable economic climate were removed, however, the absence of a price
stability mandate led inexorably to the debacle of the 1930s.
While what happened during the Depression decade of the 1930s obviously
is very important in U.S. monetary history, I must move on now from the
“then” part of my talk to the concluding “now” part. We shall see that at least
some of the deﬁciencies in the institutional structure of American monetary
policymaking that existed in 1929 still exist, and that they present some risks,
although the risks are different from those of the earlier period.
5. INFLATION IN THE 1970s AND 1980s
We pick up our story a half-century later in the mid-1970s. At the time, inﬂation
had been rising slowly but steadily since the early 1960s. The U.S. dollar and,
through it, the world’s other major currencies, had been linked to gold under
an arrangement known as the Bretton Woods System after the town in New
Hampshire where the agreement had been forged at the end of World War II.
Under the arrangement, the U.S. had pledged to maintain convertibility of the
dollar into gold at $35 per ounce. But when excessively accommodative mon-
etary policy and gold outﬂows caused the Federal Reserve’s then 25 percent
gold reserve ratio to become binding in the mid-’60s, in sharp contrast to the
Fed’s behavior in 1920 and 1921, the gold reserve requirement was eliminated.
After some attempts to repair the Bretton Woods System, it ﬁnally collapsed
in 1973.
The year 1973 is generally remembered as the year of the ﬁrst oil price
shock, but it was also a watershed in U.S. monetary history. Before 1973 there
was a sense that both the domestic and international monetary systems should
retain at least some link to gold, even though the country had not really permit-
ted the gold standard rules to constrain monetary policy for some time. Since
1973, however, there has been a general—although not universal—belief that
the gold standard is a thing of the past. Consequently, for the last 20 years the
Fed has lacked even the weak Bretton Woods commitment to gold that would
have anchored the price level at least over the very long run and helped it deliver
price stability. Since the Federal Reserve was originally designed to operate in
an institutional environment with at least some such commitment, one might
have expected Congress, as a matter of logic, to give the Fed an explicit price
stability mandate when the Bretton Woods System fell apart. Unfortunately, no
clear mandate has been forthcoming, although Congressman Stephen Neal of
North Carolina introduced an amendment to the Federal Reserve Act in 1989
and has reintroduced it every year since that would provide such a mandate.
The Neal Amendment (sometimes referred to as the “zero inﬂation amend-
ment”) would require the Fed, over a period of time, to eliminate inﬂation as
a signiﬁcant factor in economic and business decisions. The Fed supports this    
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Amendment, and I personally believe its passage would beneﬁt the American
economy enormously.
As you probably know, Congress did pass legislation in the late 1970s that
requires the Fed to set and report targets for the growth of the U.S. money
supply. Many people, including your speaker, were hopeful at the time that this
legislation would yield more stable and noninﬂationary money growth rates,
and, hence, a more stable price level. But, frankly, it did not work well in this
period. As measured by the Consumer Price Index, the inﬂation rate rose from
4.9 percent in 1976 to 13.3 percent in 1979 and 12.5 percent in 1980. To be
sure, the higher inﬂation partly reﬂected the continued sharp increases in oil
prices in this period. But it is also true that money supply growth exceeded
its targets almost continuously throughout the late 1970s. This performance
created doubts about the Fed’s commitment to the targets, which encouraged
inﬂationary price- and wage-setting behavior even before the oil price shock.
Congress’ willingness to accept the inﬂationary money growth rates, and its
failure to mandate the Federal Reserve to stabilize prices, further undermined
the public’s conﬁdence that inﬂation would be resisted. In short, by the late
1970s the Fed had little if any credibility as an inﬂation ﬁghter or as a defender
of the purchasing power of the dollar.
6. AGGRESSIVE INFLATION FIGHTING IN THE 1980s
By the time Paul Volcker became Federal Reserve Chairman in August 1979,
the inﬂation outlook had begun to deteriorate rapidly. The widely publicized
announcement on October 6, 1979, of the Federal Reserve’s intention to control
money growth more closely inaugurated a period of aggressive inﬂation ﬁght-
ing. The announcement signaled ﬁnancial markets and the country that the Fed
was prepared to take responsibility for delivering low inﬂation, even without
an explicit mandate for price stability from Congress.
But the announcement was just the beginning. Because the Fed’s credibility
as an inﬂation ﬁghter had been so badly compromised, the System had to follow
the announcement with strong actions to demonstrate its intent, much as the
Fed had had to do in the early 1920s. And strong action was taken in the form
of a severe tightening of policy that took short-term interest rates from around
11 percent in late 1979 to 17 percent by April 1980 and ultimately to around 20
percent by early 1981. This was the sharpest tightening the Federal Reserve had
ever engineered in so short a time. The action succeeded in bringing inﬂation
down to around 4 percent in 1982. In addition, in a manner similar to the early
1920s, it greatly enhanced the Fed’s credibility as a defender of the purchasing
power of the dollar, although—in another parallel to the ’20s—it was accompa-
nied by a sharp and costly contraction. This credibility, combined with (in yet
another parallel to the ’20s) the able leadership of Chairman Volcker and his    
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successor, Alan Greenspan, has enabled the Fed to maintain the low inﬂation
rate in subsequent years and, indeed, to reduce it somewhat further to a trend
rate currently of approximately 3 percent.
7. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PARALLELS BETWEEN THE
’20s AND THE ’80s: A CONCLUDING COMMENT
As we have seen, Federal Reserve policy in the early 1980s had much in com-
mon with that of the 1920s. Both decades opened with periods of exceedingly
tight monetary policy in response to earlier accelerations of inﬂation, and the
restrictive policies succeeded in bringing inﬂation sharply downward in both
periods. Beyond this, the Fed’s strong actions in each instance conferred upon
it an enhanced credibility that helped keep inﬂation low for the remainder of
the decade. Moreover, unusually capable central bankers in both periods took
advantage of this credibility to pursue price stability with essentially discre-
tionary actions, even though Strong was acting within the overall framework
of the gold standard in the earlier period.
There is one ﬁnal, less comforting comparison between the two periods,
however, that needs to be drawn. As I have indicated, the Fed entered the 1930s
without Benjamin Strong, with an eroding and exceedingly deﬂationary gold
standard, and with no alternative, explicit price stability mandate. Currently, the
Fed is moving toward the end of this century and the beginning of the next in
a stronger and qualitatively different condition. Inﬂation, rather than deﬂation,
is the current concern. Economic conditions are more tranquil now than they
were at the end of 1929, despite the many problems we still face. Further,
in my opinion the Fed currently enjoys energetic and very capable leadership.
However, as in 1929, there is no clear mandate for the Fed to pursue price-level
stability. This makes many of us who work at the Fed uneasy, and it explains
why the Federal Reserve supports Congressman Neal’s Amendment, which, as
I noted earlier, would provide us with such a mandate.
In short, ladies and gentlemen, under present institutional arrangements
surrounding the conduct of American monetary policy, maintenance of a sound
dollar in the longer-term future will require continued strong leadership at the
Fed, an absence of major destabilizing economic shocks like the oil shocks
of the 1970s and, ultimately, a measure of good luck. The continuation of all
these circumstances indeﬁnitely would be fortuitous. I don’t feel very comfort-
able in this situation, and you shouldn’t feel comfortable either—especially the
younger people in the audience. This economic issue may seem less immediate
and pressing than some of the others you’ve faced over the last day and a half.
But I can assure you that it is no less important. We need to resolve it promptly.